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1 Introduction
Conflict Studies, Conflict Prevention and Early Warning
During the Cold War era the two superpowers regularly intervened in conflicts across
the globe, especially those taking place in régions of the Third World, such as South-
East Asia and Africa. Since these conflicts erupted at a safe distance from the core areas
of superpower compétition (Europe, the Middle East) the superpowers could intervene
without risking uncontrollable nuclear confrontation.
By intervening in those régions they could pursue their own strategie interests, and,
because of this, such regional or localized conflicts were interpreted almost exclusively
within the framework of East-West compétition. The superpowers would intervene
with the sole or principal purpose of countering the (perceived) influence of their rival
and would try and find a 'solution' to the conflict that would be in conformity with their
own interests. Such solutions would invariably involve the support, by military or other
means, of one particular side to the conflict, rather than the conscious pursuit of a
peaceful solution to the conflict as such. In other words, these conflicts were not the
object of altruistic and (relatively) impartial efforts at mediating an end to violence, but
they constituted - at least for the superpowers - wars by proxy serving one of their
spécifie strategie objectives. As a resuit, their actions did not usually amount to
Containment or resolution, let alone prevention, of violent conflicts, but often had a
contrary, intensifying effect on the level of hostilities.
The fall of the Berlin Wall signalled the end of this rivalry and, consequently, the
withdrawal of the superpowers from the distant théâtres of conflict in the Southern
hémisphère. It was no longer necessary to intervene in those conflicts for the sake of
defending Western or Soviet interests. While this had the benefit of putting an end to
the intensifying effects of superpower meddling, it also meant that there were no longer
any external agencies around - at least not of comparable stature - to médiate, contain
or résolve conflicts. This amounted to a process of strategie marginalization which, at
least in Africa, coincided with a process of steady economie décline.
In a way one could say that this did not matter much, at least not initially, for in the
Western world the end of the Cold War was accompanied by a naive optimism that one
had reached the end of major ideological confrontations - indeed, the end of history
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itself.1 Yet, any illusions that nothing dramatic was going to disturb thé serenity of the
post-Cold War era were quickly shattered by thé éruption of conflicts at thé fringes of
thé Western world, namely thé Balkans, Africa and thé southern régions of the former
Soviet Union. Many of thèse conflicts, moreover, involved very complex, mfra-state
struggles, were often very violent and in several cases concerned thé very ideological
issue of communal groups and their conflicting identities. Rwanda and Bosnia are
typical examples.
In fact, it seemed that post-Cold War conflicts, and especially complex domestic
conflicts in Third World countries, were on thé increase, although mis was probably
more due to thé fact that political observers now turned their attention to régions they
had formerly ignored in the context of East-West confrontation, than to an actual
increase in those conflicts. Nevertheless, it does appear that thé life cycle of conflicts
began to grow longer.2 Whether or not this was related to thé subsidence of Cold War
rivalry, superpower withdrawal meant that thé task for intervention in violent conflicts
was bequeathed to other international actors, i.e. international organizations such as thé
United Nations, thé Organization for Security and Coopération in Europe (OSCE) or
thé Economie Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
However, thé nature of post-Cold War intervention in conflicts by inter-govem-
mental institutions differed greatly from thé compétitive character of interférence by thé
nuclear powers. First of ail, it appeared that intervention was now dictated, not by thé
narrow interests of some dominant states, but by a humanitarian or enlightened
purpose: thé alleviation of human suffering. Secondly, thé task of intervention in
conflicts had now been entrusted to actors without much rational considération as to
their capabilities and thé requirements posed by crisis situations. The shortcomings of
international organizations became clear rather quickly, among others because their
intervention in certain conflicts followed upon tardy and belated decision-making and,
consequently, faced situations that had already spiralled out of control, sometimes well
beyond thé stage of state collapse. Libéria and Somalia are thé cases in point. In several
of thèse conflicts thé international community failed dismally to affect a meaningful
change. Somalia, Rwanda, but for a long time Bosnia and Libéria as well, underlined
thé inability of thé United Nations to put an end to some of the worst carnage since thé
end of the Second World War.
Among both scholars and policy-makers - in and outside international organiz-
ations - this state of affairs gave impetus to thé argument that it would probably be
easier, and in any case cheaper, to intervene in conflicts before they had escalatéd to
higher levels of intensity. Indeed, it was argued that it would be better if one would try
and prevent the éruption of violent conflicts in thé first place. In this case one could
1 F. Fukuyama, The End o/History and thé Last Man (New York, 1992).
2 J.G. Siccama and A. Oostindiër, Veranderingen in het conflictpatroon na de Koude Oorlog,
misverstanden en feiten (Clingendael Notitie: The Hague, 1995), p. 23.
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better influence the standpoints of the parties, which at this stage would not yet have
committed their resources to realize a military breakthrough. 'Entrapment' or over-
commitment3 of their resources makes parties less amenable to médiation, also because,
in long drawn out conflicts, they can become so bogged down that they cannot observe
or formulate peaceful alternatives as a result of cognitive rigidity.4
Any action to prevent the éruption of violence would, of course, require clear
forewarning of impending trouble. Together with the increase (in the observation) of
conflicts, this stimulated interest among scholars and policy-makers, firstly, in the
origins, causation and nature of human conflicts as such. Conflict studies therefore
received a new lease of life. Numerous countries, universities and research institutes
began to develop new research programmes, often involving international coopérative
efforts and active government support and finance, in order to gain a better understand-
ing of the intricacies of conflict processes.
Secondly, an aspect of these conflict studies that began to receive special attention
was the issue of 'early waming'. With its origins in the sphère of military relations -
especially the nuclear balance of power - and the prédiction and management of natural
disasters such as drought, famine and refugee flows, scholars extended the concept's
application to the area of violent conflicts in général. Early warning in this context was
formulated as a special tooi in stratégies of conflict prevention or, to use an older term,
préventive diplomacy. ff put into practice, it would involve the collection of data on the
basis of uniform, systematized procedures; their analysis according to a proper
scientific methodology; and, if it would be concluded that those data pointed to a high
probability of impending violent conflict, the transmission of a warning to political
decision-makers. Those decision-makers could men take the requisite steps - so-called
'early action' - to prevent the conflict from reaching a violent phase or, alternatively,
from escalating to higher levels of violence. This, in a nutshell, is the idea behind early
warning and its rôle in the prevention of conflicts. Both the concept of early warning
and that of conflict prevention also constitute the more policy-oriented dimension of
conflict studies.
Conflict Research at the Clingendael Institute
Since 1994-1995 both the study of conflicts as such and the study of the issues of early
warning and conflict prevention have been part of the research programme of the
See for this I.W Zartman, 'Conflict Réduction' Prevention, Management, and Resolution', in F M
Deng and I.W. Zartman (eds), Conflict Resolution in Africa (Washington, 1991), ch. 11
M. Deutsch, 'Subjective Features of Conflict Résolution: Psychological, Social and Cultural
Influences', in R. Vayrynen (éd.), New Directions in Conflict Theoty: Conflict Resolution and
Conflict Transformation (London and New Delhi, 1991 ), pp. 37-50; and M. Deutsch, The Resolution
of Conflict (New Haven and London, 1973), p. 351.
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Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'ClingendaeF. This research was
commissioned by, and is being executed at the bebest of, the Directorate-General for
International Coopération of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
THE CAUSES OF CONFLICT IN THE THIRD WORLD
In 1995 the Clingendael Institute commenced a research project entitled 'causes of
conflict in the Third World'. The first phase of the project began with a Clingendael
Occasional Paper? followed by an international conference on the subject and the
publication of a book called Between Development and Destruction: An Enquiry into
the Causes of Conflict in Post-Colonial States.6
The project amounts to a comparative analysis of the causes of conflict in three
régions of the Third World, namely South Asia, West Africa and Central America. In
collaboration with research Institutes in those régions case-studies were written on
fourteen countries, i.e. Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Ghana,
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador.
The project's objectives were dual: first, to contribute to the formulation or élaboration
of théories on causes of conflict and, second, to make the results of the project available
for recommendations on development coopération policy to the Dutch government, as
well as to encourage the debate within the régions concerned on the formulation of
policy with regard to conflict resolution and prévention.
The concept of conflict was approached in such a way as to signify only violent
conflict and thus exclude those disputes that do not have a violent character. Levels of
violence may naturally oscillate between low-intensity conflict, such as guerrilla
warfare, and completely escalated civil wars and génocides. However, conflict was
essentially defined in terms of a process involving, among others, a dispute or pre-
hostilities phase, a violent phase and a post-hostilities phase. Conflicts thus involve a
life cycle in which certain variables may bring a dispute into a violent phase or a violent
conflict back to the stage of non-violent interaction.
Confronted with the lack of comprehensive théories about the causes of violent
conflict, the project assumed that human conflicts are multi-causal phenomena in which
different combinations of independent variables can lead to different outcomes -
namely the éruption or absence of violence. Although this multi-causality makes it hard
to include all relevant data in a model, it was assumed that one can, in fact, identify
certain key factors with regard to violent conflict that can be broadly categorized as
political, military and socio-economic. In order to find out which factors are responsible
for violent conflicts, the research was executed in the framework of a uniform, analyti-
5 Entiüed 'Conflict and Development: The Causes of Conflict in Developing Countries', written by Luc
van de Goor.
6 Edited by L. van de Goor, K. Rupesinghe and P. Sciarone (London, 1996).
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cal cadre. For this, recourse was taken to Alexander George's method of 'structured,
focused comparison'.7 This, put simply, comes down to a systematized procedure for
the collection and processing of data with the help of a checklist which includes all
factors that may potentially be relevant in the éruption of violence. In addition, the
research project aimed to test nine spécifie hypotheses in order to give the project more
focus.8
RESEARCH ON EARLY WARNING AND CONFLICT PREVENTION: THE FIRST PHASE
In order to enhance and speed up the more policy-oriented aspects of conflict research
at the Clingendael Institute, the Directorate-General for International Coopération of
the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs commissioned a project that would focus
specifically on the issues of early warning and the prevention of conflicts. This project
commenced with an overview of the political practice of international governmental
organizations in this field. This overview dealt with various international institutions:
the Organization for Security and Coopération in Europe; the United Nations; the
Organization of American States (OAS); the Association of South-East Asian Nations
(ASEAN); and, fmally, several organizations on the African continent, namely the
Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Economie Community of West African
States, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in the Horn of
Africa and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). This overview was
published as a Clingendael Occasional Paper in February 1996.9 The main findings of
this report, which are presented in outline in the next chapter, were the subject of
lengthy discussions at an international symposium, which was held at the Clingendael
Institute in November 1996 and gathered together several scholars and représentatives
of national governments, inter-governmental organizations and NGOs. Chapters 3 to 7
of the present volume form the off-shoot of the papers presented at tMs conference,
while the appendix summarizes the main trends of the debates triggered by these
contributions.
7 See A.L. George, 'Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused
Comparison', in P.G. Lauren (ed.), Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Diplomacy
(New York, 1979) and ibid., 'Case Studies and Theory Development', paper presented to the Second
Annual Symposium on Information Processing in Organisation, Carnegie-Mellon University, 15-16
Octoberl982.
8 The results of the project will be published in the course of 1998 in the form of three regional reports
and one synthesis report.
9 Entitled 'Conflict Prevention and Early Warning in the Political Practice of International
Organizations' (TheHague, 1996).
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THE SECOND PHASE OF RESEARCH ON CONFLICT PREVENTION: THE WEST AFRICAN
REGION UNDER SCRUTINY
Before introducing thé structure and contents of this book it is necessary to give a
cursory outline of the on-going research on conflict prevention at the Clingendael
Institute, in order to put the present volume in the context of its genera! research
programme.
With the completion of the present volume, the Clingendael research on conflict
prevention has begun to focus specifically on the West African région. This second
phase was developed at the request of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is
related to the Clingendael project on the Causes of Conflict in the Third World and is
executed in joint collaboration with researchers in West Africa, Central America and
the United Kingdom. The objective of the research on conflict prevention in West
Africa is to investigate the needs and requirements feit in that région with regard to the
Containment and prevention of (inter- and intra-state) conflicts and to integrate the
lessons learnt by other régions in this issue-area. To this purpose, this second phase
aims to analyse the strengths, defïciencies and weaknesses of the various ways and
means of conflict Containment and prevention, as employed and experienced by
different political actors and institutions in West Africa. Some of these aspects have
been touched upon in the Occasional Paper mentioned above, as well as in the second
chapter of this volume, and will be elaborated more fully in the course of this second
stage.
Research will thus concentrate especially on the practices and activities of conflict
prevention and Containment at the sub-state level and by non-governmental actors and
institutions,10 while also providing a policy-oriented analysis of the conflict préventive
activities of the Economie Community of West African States.11 Comparisons are then
made with the expériences gained in this area by the Organization for Security and
Coopération in Europe and the various actors that were involved, in the late 1980s, in
ending the civil wars in the Central American région. The insights that will be generated
at this second stage will, by their policy-oriented focus, make relevant knowledge
10 One could think of provincial and local authorities, (neo-)traditional leaders like clan elders and
chieftaincies, former political leaders, active in mediating in conflicts, African-based human rights
groups and other pressure groups of civil society. This component of the project will be drafted in the
form of a sélective inventory of West African actors and institutions involved in the field of conflict
prevention.
11 This part of the project concerns a study of the ECOWAS-sponsored intervention in the Liberian civil
war.
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available to appropriate levels of decision-making12 and provide a new stimulus to the
debate in this field.
The Volume in Outline: Structure and Contents
This book, however, has a scholarly perspective. lts objective is therefore to provide a
contribution to the on-going debate in the academie community on the possibilités and
requirements for, as well as the limitations of, policies of early warning and conflict
prevention.
As mentioned above, the book starts with a concise overview of the practices of
conflict prevention and early warning as developed by international governmental
organizations since the end of the Cold War. For this purpose the next chapter uses a
deliberately narrow définition of the concept of conflict prevention, which is not
followed in the other contributions to the volume: in this overview conflict prevention
will dénote any kind of (political, economie, military) action with the aim of preventing
the éruption of violence as such. In other words, activities can only be deemed conflict
préventive if they take place before a conflict has reached the phase of armed violence
(the so-called dispute phase). If those activities take place after violence has already
erupted, they should be considered under the headings of the older and familiär
concepts of conflict médiation, conflict Containment, conflict management or conflict
réduction.
Although it is readily conceded that the distinction between prevention and
Containment of conflict is not sharp and that third-party intervention in conflicts must
be analysed as part of a continuüm of activities along the life cycle of a conflict, it is
also crucial to realize that the practice and vocabulary of international politics and
diplomacy can be rather slick. The result is that, in political practice, the concepts of
early warning and conflict prevention are so far being used, not only in an inarticulate
way and as synonyms for other concepts, but also with a frequency that may at times
create the impression that conflict préventive activities have already become a struc-
tural feature of the post-Cold War era. Thus, a strict définition of conflict prevention
must be employed in order to distinguish between mere lip-service to, and concrete
policies of, conflict prevention. The following chapters will, however, employ a broader
12 One could think here not only of West African governments, but also of ECOWAS itself, other inter-
governmental organizations in and outside Africa, NGOs and the donor community generally.
Enhancing institution building and strengthening the research capacity of the West African région is
another objective of this phase, which was included in line with development coopération policy of the
Netherlands government. It is also the intention of the Clingendael Institute to undertake a third,
policy-oriented phase in its conflict research programme, which will merge the project on the causes of
conflict in the Third World with the research on early warning and conflict prevention.
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définition that relates early waming and conflict prevention also to activities to prevent
the escalation of hostilities.
The central argument of thé second chapter is that international organizations are
almost solely preoccupied with tackling existing conflicts, rather than potential or
impending conflicts in thé future. Almost ail organizations are only activated to
produce a response to conflicts once violence has already occurred. This is especially
true for inter-governmental organizations in Africa, whose response capacity has
always been very low, although thé récent record of the Southern African Development
Community may be evaluated in a more positive way.
Moreover, properly designed early warning Systems, in Africa and elsewhere, are
very rare. Only thé United Nations and some of its Specializéd Agencies can boast early
warning Systems or procédures that to some extent resemble thé requirements of
scholarly models of systematic collection, analysis and processing of indicators of
potential violence. The UN's fact-fînding capacity is in this respect relevant for some of
the world's smaller, regional organizations. The Organization for Security and Coopér-
ation in Europe stands out for its unconventional early warning capability in thé form of
a High Commissioner on National Minorities, whose activities are usually considered
as highly relevant to thé prévention of conflicts in former Eastern bloc countries. The
Organization of American States and thé Association of South-East Asian Nations do
not possess any structures that provide for early warning of violent political troubles
ahead. Contrary to thé African institutions, thèse organizations do not even pay
(regulär) lip-service to thé concepts of prévention and early warning.
More generally, inter-governmental organizations can so far boast very little
activity, let alone success, with respect to developing and implementing conflict
préventive stratégies. Only thé Organization for Security and Coopération in Europe
cornes doser, with its System of consultation procédures, to providing a strategy with
which to prevent the éruption of armed conflicts. However, thé post-Cold War record of
both thé OSCE and other organizations, such as thé UN, is also marked by spectacular
failures to thwart thé éruption or escalation of, especially, civil wars. Much of their
activity can be criticized as being too little, too late.
The second chapter also analyses what kind of events or developments thé various
inter-governmental organizations consider to be signais of impending armed conflict -
quite apart from thé question of whether, from a scientifîc point of view, such interpré-
tations are correct. Related to this, thé chapter investigates what concept of security
inter-governmental institutions adhère to. Their perceptions of - what are supposed to
be - signais of impending trouble, as well as their security concepts, hâve a direct
bearing on their décisions of whether or not to respond to developments, while they also
influence thé way in which they will respond.
The chapter shows that international organizations hâve developed divergent views
on signais of potential violent conflict and that thé related security concepts vary
considerably. There are, however, also similarities between some of the organizations
discussed. Both thé OSCE and thé United Nations employ rather broad concepts of
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security and consider a large array of events or developments as signs of potential
violent conflict. While the O AS focuses on coups d'état, as threats to hemispheric
stability rather than signs of impending intra-state violence, évidence for Africa's
international organizations is still rather thin. The OAU does not emphasize particular
developments or events as signais of potential conflict, but in practice has devoted
considérable time in trying to de-escalate thé conflicts in thé Gréât Lakes région. While
ECOWAS is almost solely concerned with thé conflicts in Libéria and Sierra Leone,
évidence on SADC and IGAD is still inconclusive. In ail cases, however, security
concepts hâve steadily broadened since the end of the Cold War, which in practice
means that humanitarian considérations hâve gained in importance when it cornes to
deciding on, and legitimizing, intervention in conflicts.
The way in which thèse organizations tend to process and respond to (perceived)
signais of conflict varies as well. In thé OSCE this takes place through the High
Commissioner on National Minorities, as well as the complex System of consultation
procédures that aim to reduce tensions between member states. While ASEAN's
processing of, and response to, conflicts are dépendent on bilatéral forms of coopér-
ation, in thé UN, OAS and OAU thé secrétariat and its Secretary-General hâve in this
respect been given upgraded rôles. However, parallels in institutional and procédural
responses to conflicts are rather limited. On thé whole, each Organization seems to hâve
its own peculiar solutions to very spécifie institutional expériences.
In chapter 3 Howard Adelman sketches the historical background to the idea of early
warning. The concept's origins are dual: early warning came into use in thé world of
military intelligence - where it was meant to help prevent hostile acts by perceived
enemies - as well as in the context of humanitarian assistance to victims of natural
disasters like hurricanes, drought and famine. The post-Cold War conception of early
warning is, however, mainly rooted in this second, humanitarian usage of the term.
Adelman describes thé attempts to establish an early warning capability and structure in
thé UN, among others by way of thé Office for Research and thé Collection of Informa-
tion (ORCI), in thé work of which he participated. Following ORCI's démise, thé three
principal departments of thé UN secrétariat - thé Departments of Political Affairs,
Peace-keeping Opérations and Humanitarian Affairs - developed another early
warning procédure to ensure thé collection, exchange and analysis of information
between them. Adelman also provides an overview of the research that is being
undertaken in the NGO sector and the académie Community.
In his second contribution to thé volume Adelman discusses at length the interaction
between early warning and thé management of conflicts. In particular, he analyses
process and structural problems in thé necessary networking between organizations,
institutions and individuals involved in the monitoring of (potentially) violent conflicts
and thé issuing of warnings about impending or escalating violence to thé relevant
contexts of decision-makers. Adelman focuses specifically on the problem of comr^
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cation and thé rôle of perception (that is, of conflicts) among external observera and
decision-makers in such a netwerking process. His central contention is that the
problem of sharing data on potentially escalating conflicts between thé various agencies
involved in early warning, as well as thé way in which relevant early warnings of those
conflicts are phrased, presented and perceived, are as important as thé attempt to
establish a system or model of reliable indicators of conflict as such. Moreover, thé
sharing and transmission of information, thé way in which early warnings are phrased
and presented, the development of models of indicators and the formulation of a
response strategy to conflicts are ail interrelated.
For example, if a conflict is viewed as an age-old struggle between ethnie groups
that are at war with each for thé simple reason of having différent cultural identities, one
is likely to conclude ('warn') that the conflict is insoluble - something that will
negatively affect the nature of the response of those who are supposed to intervene and
stop the conflict. Even if a process of conflict management is starled up, subséquent
escalation signais run the risk of being ignored. Policy-makers with a vested interest in
a negotiating process may exhibit a built-in disposition to focus on those actors who are
prepared to talk, and neglect the more extreme forces favouring violence. As argued by
Adelman, the very process of conflict management may itself inhibit and distort the
ability to read and interpret signais because of the efforts already invested in that
process. Thus, early warning and conflict management have a complicated relationship
that is not always mutually reinforcing.
Problems of perception are therefore not limited to actors who are parties to the
conflict, but extend to those who are monitoring the conflict and formulate early
warnings, as well as those responsible for policy- and decision-making. Different
institutional cultures may come into play here and, in the course of the netwerking
process necessary for the observation of conflict signais and the formulation of early
warnings, seriously complicate the conflict issues and the production of response
stratégies. Adelman discusses the barriers to the proper reception of conflict signais,
such as the drowning of signais of impending conflict by contradictory indicators or by
signais of other potential conflicts, as well as the possibilities of misinterpretation and
rejection by decision-makers.
The initial stages of the early warning process are impaired by the fact that, in the
academie community, no one model of indicators has been accepted. Different categor-
izations, as well as different terminology and labelling of conflicts, are being used. This
contributes to confusion, may jeopardize the proper processing and interprétation of
data and, in fact, may become a part of the conflict itself. Adelman illustrâtes this by a
case-study describing reactions to the events in Rwanda during the early 1990s, which
certain organizations for some time refused to label genocide for reasons of
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expediency.13 Agencies involved in monitoring conflicts or human rights may not wish
to antagonize the regime of the country concerned by using a particular label, while
actors and institutions that are provided with early warnings of conflicts may, for
ideological or power political reasons, refuse to listen and act upon those warnings.
Furthermore, even within one single organization the netwerking necessary for
producing and transmitting early warning messages may be a problem because of
internai bureaucratie rivalries.
In chapter 5 Peter Wallensteen takes up the issue of how to improve our reading of
potential conflict signais. He contends that there are at least four aspects in the process
of early warning that require our attention. First, one must, of course, come up with the
indicators of impending trouble, in other words, issue the warning as such. The second
element is that of receptivity, namely how to phrase warnings in such a way that
decision-makers will take note. His third point is that, since the relationship between
warnings, their reception and subséquent préventive actions is not a straightforward
one, the conditions under which states and international organizations will take action
must be studied, including thé types of action that are needed to prevent (further)
escalation. Finally, early action will have to be followed up by subséquent préventive
activities if it does not immediately remove the escalatory pressures in the conflict, thus
raising thé question of long-term commitment of thé intervening parties.
If conflicts intensify, this may take two différent forms - protracted or rapid
intensification - both of which affect the four above-mentioned aspects of the early
warning process in différent ways. In case of sudden, rapid intensification, the party
initiating thé use of violence will probably try to gain a tactical advantage by surprising
its opponent. Since, in Wallensteen's words, 'surprise is the game', the violent stage of
thèse conflicts (whether inter-state or domestic) is preceded by a relative dearth of
indicators of impending trouble. Official statements and open threats will be few and
far between, although troop movements, military manoeuvres and arms purchases may
signal thé intensification of the conflict. Other signais are shifts in thé use of military
resources and austerity measures in the civilian sectors, but also new forms of propa-
ganda, media coverage and the actions of extremist groups. While the collection of
information on such signais used to be the exclusive preserve of national intelligence
agencies, the end of the Cold War and the concomitant lise in humanitarian concerns
may have increased the opportunities for inter-governmental organizations and other
actors to gather such data.
In cases of protracted intensification, acts of violence, as well as the parties and
issues involved, have been around for some time and are known to thé outside world.
13 Adelman was the co-author of an excellent analysis of the Rwanda genocide. See H. Adelman and A.
Suhrke, Early Waming and Conflict Management (Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of
Emergency Assistance to Rwanda: Odense, 1996).
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Still, although external actors could have taken action at earlier stages, they are still
regularly taken by surprise when the conflict enters a phase of intensification. Early
warning indicators should thus focus on unsolved problems, refugee populations that
originated during earlier periods and thé flow of small arms.
However, since even conflicts that expérience rapid intensification are usually
known beforehand to thé outside world, it may be better to focus on what to do rather
than how to predict. Since decision-makers hâte to be taken by surprise, their receptiv-
ity to early warning of conflicts with rapid intensification may be higher than to those
with protracted intensification, although, paradoxically, there will be less opportunity
for préventive action. Wallensteen argues that thé reverse is true for cases of protracted
intensification. Such conflicts may offer several moments of effective intervention, yet
external actors are likely to consider thèse conflicts as continuous, insoluble issues and
thus be reluctant to act. Again, thé dimension of perception of conflicts cornes into play
hère.
Wallensteen also discusses thé types of action to be taken by decision-makers, such
as direct or Containment action, as well as their impact on thé parties to the conflict. He
also analyses the need for sustained action, that is, beyond the initial period of interven-
tion, and various problems that may hâve a négative impact on thé détermination of the
intervening actors to continue with their préventive activities.
In noting that thé permanent members of thé UN Security Council are likely to evaluate
thé need for préventive action from thé perspective of their own stratégie interests,
Wallensteen ties thé analysis of early warning firmly to the 'realist' approach to
international politics. Thus, in chapter 6 Ruddy Doom reintroduces thé analysis of the
structures of international relations to thé debate on early warning and conflict preven-
tion which, for logical reasons, has been somewhat overshadowed by humanitarian
arguments.
In discussing the political prerequisites of conflict prevention by external actors,
Doom emphasizes very strongly that good intentions are not enough if one wishes to
formulate and implement conflict préventive stratégies. Early warning and conflict
prevention have become almost magical formulas that have to be handled with gréât
care if one wants to avoid disappointment. Practical guidelines for concrète objectives
are needed, as well as a willingness to work on the basis of mère probabilities rather
than inflated expectations. In Doom's words, peace is not only morality, but also a
matter of politics.
Ha ving set thé tone for his contribution, he notes that foreign affairs were, and to a
considérable extent still are, the monopoly of political élites - both in parliamentary and
authoritarian Systems. Moreover, public opinion is generally less concerned with
distant, international issues than with domestic problems: since solidarity evolves along
concentric circles, its strength and effectiveness usually diminish with geographical
distance.
Perhaps more importantly, Doom analyses thé concept of international Community - a
term that is widely used and abused in policy-making and activist circles. Although one
may state the obvious, such a Community does not exist. Rather, we face a structural
contradiction between a globalized economie system and political structures that are by
and large still rooted in, and oriented towards, the nation-state. International organiz-
ations do not really compensate for mis, as these are generally inter-state institutions.
Thus, states have a tendency to define peace as the mere absence of open violence
between states rather than in terms of sustainable peace, for fear of turning their own
countries into targets of external interférence. Intervention in conflicts will take place
on the basis of an interest calculus which makes it improbable that conflict prevention,
instead of non-intervention in internai affairs, will become the guiding principle of
international politics.
Doom continues with a fundamental discussion about the (im)possibilities of
predicting our political future or, more specifically, the éruption or escalation of
conflicts. For mis he borrows from so-called chaos theory, which was first formulated
in the natural sciences: since societies constitute open and dynamic Systems that contain
a multitude of interactions, there is a continuous tendency towards change and instabil-
ity - notwithstanding the présence of some degree of order or 'structures' (i.e. funda-
mental patterns of interaction) in social relations. All Systems - physical and social -
possess préservation laws that enable them to absorb small disturbances in those
patterns. Yet this is only true to some degree, since when the system is already consider-
ably off-balance, even minor events may lead to enormous shifts in such patterns. One
can therefore only make prédictions in terms of probabilities. Moreover, the more a
system is off-balance, the more potential situations will present themselves and, thus,
the smaller the chance of success for a particular action or strategy directed to solve or
contain a conflict. Cost/efficiency ratios of intervention activities décline sharply when
this so-called 'bifurcation threshold' is passed. This confirms the contention noted in
the introduction of this chapter that it is easier to avert conflict in its earlier stages - a
conclusion that is at odds with the observation that, due to power political reasons,
conflict prevention will never become a dominant strategy in international relations. A
case-study on the events in eastern Zaire in 1996 illustrâtes Doom's arguments on
chaos theory, conflict prevention and power politics.
Pleading for a modest approach to conflict prevention he also argues that, first of
all, conflicts innere in social and political life and should therefore not always become
the target of préventive action. They should not be stopped for the mere sake of
stability, but be tackled along the lines of sustainable development. Conflict prevention
should have the modest goal of trying to contain violent conflicts, i.e. to prevent the
worst case scenario of total escalation, rather than the utopian objective of resolving the
contentieus issues.
In this respect chapter 7 concentrâtes on the question of how the United Nations can
improve upon its record. To this purpose James Sutterlin, who has worked inside the
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UN Secrétariat for more than a décade, outlines thé early warning process in terms of
three phases: information gathering, analysis of data and communication of warnings.
Ail three must be effective if thé process is to function satisfactorily.
For its information thé UN dépends on both primary and secondary sources.
Among thé first one might mention public média, member states and UN field posts,
while secondary sources are NGOs, thé académie community, UN functional offices
and other inter-governmental organizations. In collecting data the world body is
hindered by résistance of member states, which usually disapprove of UN offices and
représentatives reporting on their actions and policies, Thus, thé absence of a proper
intelligence capability hampers UN efforts to prevent conflicts. While thé UN Special-
ized Agencies and functional offices possess considérable information that could be of
use in this regard, this source of data is as yet untapped because thèse organizations do
not wish to antagonize thé member states in question and thereby put at risk their
représentatives in the field. Moreover, there is no System or procédure through which
such information can be reported to a central office within thé main United Nations
structure.
The analysis of early warning data is focused mainly in thé Department of Political
Affairs and carried out by régional divisions that employ qualitative méthodologies on
a country-specific basis. Policy analysis teams then review the submissions of the
régional division teams. Although thé Department of Political Affairs has, in thé words
of Sutterlin, 'thé responsibility to identify potential and actual conflicts' and recom-
mend on thèse issues to thé Secretary-General, it also has to coordinate and plan its
actions with thé other two departments - Peace-keeping Opérations and Humanitarian
Affairs - with which it shares responsibility as far as this phase of the early warning
process is concerned. Sutterlin describes thé weaknesses in this system, such as thé lack
of social and economie indicators, the absence of contact with thé académie community
and thé operational tasks of the three above-mentioned departments which leave little
time for thorough analysis of relevant data.
Apart from noting thé necessity that reports with important data penetrate thé
circles of decision-makers around thé Secretary-General, he discusses thé need for
systematic provision of data to thé UN Secrétariat by functional organizations such as
the FAO, UNHCR and UNEP, as well as régional organizations like thé OSCE and thé
OAU. Sutterlin opines that thé régional institutions should, theoretically, be well
equipped to engage in préventive activities in their région as they are more familiär with
thé causes of, and issues surrounding, local conflicts. However, judging from their
performance with regard to conflict resolution and Containment - rather than prévention
as such - he considers that their record is at best doubtful, with thé exception of the
OSCE.
Thèse remarks take thé analysis to thé possibilités, as well as thé limitations, of a so-
called global division of labour between thé UN and other (régional) organizations. The
difficulties inhérent in such a division of labour were put in sharp relief by thé famous
policy document An Agenda for Peace by former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali
and thé 1993 constitutive document that introduced the O AU's 'Mechanism for
Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution'. While in thé former document thé
hope was expressed that the world's regional institutions could develop a more
significant rôle in the field of conflict prevention,14 the latter document orders the OAU
to take recourse to the UN for financial, logistical and military assistance if conflicts
deteriorate to such an extent that more wide-ranging intervention is considered
necessary.15 While this underlines the fact that both the world body and regional
organizations expérience serious problems in realizing an effective strategy of conflict
prevention, it is nevertheless clear that not all activities necessary for the prevention of
the world' s conflicts can be undertaken by the UN.
Thus chapters 8 and 9 investigate what rôle regional organizations - whether inter-
governmental, state or non-state (NGO) institutions - can play in this regard. Since
many of the conflicts of the post-Cold War era have erupted in Africa, both chapters
discuss, albeit from different perspectives, the issue of a division of labour between
external and African institutions. While the concept of 'regional' organization can be
used to refer to both continental institutions such as the OAU and organizations whose
membership is confined to a particular région within thé continent, in chapter 8 thé
focus is mainly on thé latter type. In this chapter Gilbert Khadiagala first describes thé
mechanism for thé prévention and Containment of conflicts as established by thé OAU
in 1993. He notes that in thé five years since then thé Secretary-General has been active
in thé médiation of various conflicts, as well as thé observation of élections, but that thé
O AU's record in peace-keeping is still rather mixed, with member states being less than
enthusiastic about efforts to enhance thé organization's capacity in this area. Rather, it
is thé continent's various régions that, in Khadiagala's words, are becoming thé
'laboratories for conflict prevention, peace-keeping, and thé forging of common
values'.
Yet such rôles dépend on thé présence of certain strong and viable states that can
assume leadership in their région with regard to thé Containment or prévention of
conflicts. In discussing thé intervention of ECOWAS in thé Liberian civil war,
Khadiagala notes the staving power of ECOMOG or 'ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring
Group'. He argues that this points to thé importance of leadership in collective security,
which in this case depended on Nigeria contributing disproportionately to ECOMOG' s
military capabilities.
14 See B Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace Préventive Diplomacy, Peacemakmg and Peace-
keeping Report of thé Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Sumrmt Meeting of
thé Secunty Council on 31 January 1992 (United Nations New York, 1992), ch VII
15 See AHG/Decl.3 (XXK)/Rev 1 Déclaration of thé Assembly of Heads of State and Government on
thé Establishment within thé OAU of a Mechanism for Conflict Prévention, Management, and
Resolution (June, 1993) paragraphs 15-16 and 25
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Similarly in Southern Africa, South Africa has been able to provide leadership in thé
région after thé démise of apartheid. Thus Pretoria's intervention in Lesotho (1994)
helped restore constitutional legality to that country and, more generally, South Africa's
new profile has allowed SADC to develop a new rôle with regard to thé Containment of
conflict. Khadiagala discusses in this respect thé mandate of the newly established
SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, as well as SADC joint peace-keeping
exercises - which many observers consider to be the model for enhanced African peace-
keeping - and, perhaps more importantly, SADC's new rôle in developing a régional
consensus around shared norms and values of state behaviour in domestic and régional
politics.
In his discussion of thé East African région and thé Horn of Africa Khadiagala
observes that they differ from Southern and West Africa, primarily in thé absence of a
clearly defined leader state with sufficient resources to provide direction with regard to
régional security issues. This problem is compounded even further by overlapping
membership of various inter-state organizations and thé présence of several civil wars
and compétitive inter-state relations in thèse two régions. To illustrate thèse points
Khadiagala describes the ups and downs of IGAD(D) and thé structures of East African
coopération. Similarly, thé Gréât Lakes région has lacked both a 'sturdy régional
institutional framework' for security coopération and a clear leading state to provide it
with a sensé of direction. Zaire under Mobutu was unable to assume thé leadership of
thé Gréât Lakes area, while in the wake of Mobutu's démise and declining Western
interest it was Uganda that stepped into thé émergent power vacuüm. So far, however,
these changes have not reduced the conflict potential of the région. In this respect both
the East African Coopération agreement (EAC) of 1996 and the moribund
Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs (CEPGL) are analysed for their
potential rôle in régional security, as is the informai alliance of Eastern African leaders
(Museveni, Kabila, Kagame, Afeworki and Zenawi) which many observers hâve
dubbed 'Africa's emerging new leadership'.
Although Khadiagala's analysis is mainly concerned with thé médiation, contain-
ment and resolution of existing violent conflicts, his arguments are highly relevant to
any potential stratégies and instruments of conflict prevention as such. While contend-
ing that leadership by a particular actor is a sine qua non for successful policies by
African institutions in thèse areas, he also discusses the dilemma created by thé fact
that, while necessary for effective third-party intervention in conflicts, forceful
leadership by a particular member state may also generale obstacles preventing
régional institutions from assuming thé rôle of effective and impartial broker in African
conflicts. Central to his discussion is that this dilemma can only be resolved by thé
development of démocratie, legitimate political Systems - which he analyses under thé
heading of 'transparency'.
In thé penultimate chapter Timothy Shaw, Sandra MacLean and Katie Orr take up
this point by discussing what they call thé 'agency' of peace-keeping rôles, as well as
thé importance of non-governmental organizations in thé médiation, Containment and
prévention of African conflicts. With 'agency' they refer to thé question of who is
mainly in control of initiatives to undertake and implement humanitarian interventions
- that is, African or external powers? Like Doom they analyse third-party intervention
in the context of interest calculations by thé individual actors involved. Moreover, like
Doom they relate thé issue of peace-keeping and conflict prevention firmly to the
question of sustainable development, thé effects of structural adjustment programmes
and économie liberalization and, more generally, to thé changing patterns and features
of Africa's political économies. In this respect they lament thé tendency of intervening
powers to search for short-term palliatives rather than long-term structural solutions to
conflicts. Rather than interpreting the post-Cold War concern with humanitarian
intervention and conflict prevention as aspects of an enlightened era, their radical
perspective views these issues in terms of realpolitik, including thé rôles and activities
of NGOs therein. Furthermore, they discuss thé question of the 'division of labour'
between thé various state, inter-state and non-governmental actors involved in peace-
keeping or peace-building on thé African continent. This division of labour obviously
varies between conflict cases and thé différent stages of thèse conflicts.
In discussing - what they too see as - important new developments in thé area of
conflict Containment and prevention inside Africa's inter-governmental institutions,
they note the interesting attempts in the OAU and the UN Economie Commission for
Africa (ECA) to link these institutions to the various actors from African civil society.
However, they do not contend that the rôles played by African NGOs (or, for that
matter, external, international NGOs) in the area of conflicts is by définition always
positive or constructive. Rather, they note with concern the prolifération of African
groupings that are ethnically, regionally or religiously based, as these may also help to
exacerbate, instead of reduce, the conflict potential on the continent.
In their analysis the authors discuss the growing importance of international
(usually Western) NGOs or INGOs in what they term the 'peace-building nexus', i.e.
their increased activities in providing basic needs like health and éducation against the
backdrop of the degeneration of Africa' s states. Here they distinguish between different
types of INGOs - so-called 'programme' and 'advocacy' NGOs - and discuss their
complex relations with donor and recipiënt states, as well as with inter-governmental
institutions, and, related to this, the division of labour in the peace-keeping and peace-
building areas. These relations, just as the interactions with other (I)NGOs, can be both
collaborative and compétitive. In discussing the rôles of NGOs, the authors thus add a
dimension to the analysis of conflict prevention, early warning and humanitarian
intervention that was, until now, somewhat neglected. In linking the different types of
organizations and institutions firmly to their realist analysis of 'the peace-building
nexus', they also provide a more balanced and comprehensive perspective on early
warning and conflict prevention as one of the major issues of post-Cold War politics.
